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Abstract. Fueled by massive amounts of data, models produced by machine-
learning (ML) algorithms, especially deep neural networks, are being used in di-
verse domains where trustworthiness is a concern, including automotive systems,
finance, health care, natural language processing, and malware detection. Of par-
ticular concern is the use of ML algorithms in cyber-physical systems (CPS),
such as self-driving cars and aviation, where an adversary can cause serious con-
sequences.
However, existing approaches to generating adversarial examples and devising
robust ML algorithms mostly ignore the semantics and context of the overall sys-
tem containing the ML component. For example, in an autonomous vehicle using
deep learning for perception, not every adversarial example for the neural net-
work might lead to a harmful consequence. Moreover, one may want to prioritize
the search for adversarial examples towards those that significantly modify the
desired semantics of the overall system. Along the same lines, existing algorithms
for constructing robust ML algorithms ignore the specification of the overall sys-
tem. In this paper, we argue that the semantics and specification of the overall
system has a crucial role to play in this line of research. We present preliminary
research results that support this claim.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) algorithms, fueled by massive amounts of data, are increas-
ingly being utilized in several domains, including healthcare, finance, and transporta-
tion. Models produced by ML algorithms, especially deep neural networks (DNNs),
are being deployed in domains where trustworthiness is a big concern, such as automo-
tive systems [38], finance [27], health care [2], computer vision [30], speech recogni-
tion [19], natural language processing [41], and cyber-security [9,45]. Of particular con-
cern is the use of ML (including deep learning) in cyber-physical systems (CPS) [31],
where the presence of an adversary can cause serious consequences. For example, much
of the technology behind autonomous and driver-less vehicle development is “powered”
by machine learning [5,15,4]. DNNs have also been used in airborne collision avoidance
systems for unmanned aircraft (ACAS Xu) [24]. However, in designing and deploying
these algorithms in critical cyber-physical systems, the presence of an active adversary
is often ignored.
Adversarial machine learning (AML) is a field concerned with the analysis of ML
algorithms to adversarial attacks, and the use of such analysis in making ML algorithms
robust to attacks. It is part of the broader agenda for safe and verified ML-based sys-
tems [42,44]. In this paper, we first give a brief survey of the field of AML, with a
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particular focus on deep learning. We focus mainly on attacks on outputs or models that
are produced by ML algorithms that occur after training or “external attacks”, which
are especially relevant to cyber-physical systems (e.g., for a driverless car the ML al-
gorithm used for navigation has been already trained by the manufacturer once the “car
is on the road”). These attacks are more realistic and are distinct from other type of
attacks on ML models, such as attacks that poison the training data (see the paper [20]
for a survey of such attacks). We survey attacks caused by adversarial examples, which
are inputs crafted by adding small, often imperceptible, perturbations to force a trained
ML model to misclassify.
We contend that the work on adversarial ML, while important and useful, is not
enough. In particular, we advocate for the increased use of semantics in adversarial
analysis and design of ML algorithms. Semantic adversarial learning explores a space
of semantic modifications to the data, uses system-level semantic specifications in the
analysis, utilizes semantic adversarial examples in training, and produces not just output
labels but also additional semantic information. Focusing on deep learning, we explore
these ideas and provide initial experimental data to support them.
Roadmap. Section 2 provides the relevant background. A brief survey of adversarial
analysis is given in Section 3. Our proposal for semantic adversarial learning is given
in Section 4.
2 Background
Background on Machine Learning Next we describe some general concepts in ma-
chine learning (ML). We will consider the supervised learning setting. Consider a sam-
ple space Z of the formX×Y , and an ordered training set S = ((xi, yi))mi=1 (xi is the
data and yi is the corresponding label). Let H be a hypothesis space (e.g., weights cor-
responding to a logistic-regression model). There is a loss function ` : H × Z 7→ R so
that given a hypothesis w ∈ H and a sample (x, y) ∈ Z, we obtain a loss `(w, (x, y)).
We consider the case where we want to minimize the loss over the training set S,
LS(w) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
`(w, (xi, yi)) + λR(w).
In the equation given above, λ > 0 and the termR(w) is called the regularizer and en-
forces “simplicity” in w. Since S is fixed, we sometimes denote `i(w) = `(w, (xi, yi))
as a function only of w. We wish to find a w that minimizes LS(w) or we wish to solve
the following optimization problem:
min
w∈H
LS(w)
Example: We will consider the example of logistic regression. In this case X = Rn,
Y = {+1,−1}, H = Rn, and the loss function `(w, (x, y)) is as follows (· represents
the dot product of two vectors):
log
(
1 + e−y(w
T ·x)
)
If we use the L2 regularizer (i.e.R(w) =‖ w ‖2), then LS(w) becomes:
1
m
m∑
i=1
log
(
1 + e−yi(w
T ·xi)
)
+ λ ‖ w ‖2
Stochastic Gradient Descent. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is a popular method
for solving optimization tasks (such as the optimization problem minw∈H LS(w) we
considered before). In a nutshell, SGD performs a series of updates where each update is
a gradient descent update with respect to a small set of points sampled from the training
set. Specifically, suppose that we perform SGD T times. There are two typical forms
of SGD: in the first form, which we call Sample-SGD, we uniformly and randomly
sample it ∼ [m] at time t, and perform a gradient descent based on the it-th sample
(xit , yit):
wt+1 = G`t,ηt(wt) = wt − ηt`′it(wt) (1)
where wt is the hypothesis at time t, ηt is a parameter called the learning rate, and
`′it(wt) denotes the derivative of `it(w) evaluated at wt. We will denote G`t,ηt as Gt.
In the second form, which we call Perm-SGD, we first perform a random permutation
of S, and then apply Equation 1 T times by cycling through S according to the order of
the permutation. The process of SGD can be summarized as a diagram:
w0
G1−→w1 G2−→· · · Gt−→wt Gt+1−→ · · · GT−→wT
Classifiers. The output of the learning algorithm gives us a classifier, which is a func-
tion from <n to C, where < denotes the set of reals and C is the set of class labels.
To emphasize that a classifier depends on a hypothesis w ∈ H , which is the output of
the learning algorithm described earlier, we will write it as Fw (if w is clear from the
context, we will sometimes simply write F ). For example, after training in the case of
logistic regression we obtain a function from <n to {−1,+1}. Vectors will be denoted
in boldface, and the r-th component of a vector x is denoted by x[r].
Throughout the paper, we refer to the function s(Fw) as the softmax layer corre-
sponding to the classifier Fw. In the case of logistic regression, s(Fw)(x) is the follow-
ing tuple (the first element is the probability of−1 and the second one is the probability
of +1):
〈 1
1 + ewT ·x
,
1
1 + e−wT ·x
〉
Formally, let c = | C | and Fw be a classifier, we let s(Fw) be the function that maps
Rn to Rc+ such that ‖s(Fw)(x)‖1 = 1 for any x (i.e., s(Fw) computes a probability
vector). We denote s(Fw)(x)[l] to be the probability of s(Fw)(x) at label l. Recall that
the softmax function from Rk to a probability distribution over {1, · · · , k} = [k] such
that the probability of j ∈ [k] for a vector x ∈ Rk is
ex[j]∑k
r=1 e
x[r]
Some classifiers Fw(x) are of the form arg maxl s(Fw)(x)[l] (i.e., the classifier
Fw outputs the label with the maximum probability according to the “softmax layer”).
For example, in several deep-neural network (DNN) architectures the last layer is the
softmax layer. We are assuming that the reader is a familiar with basics of deep-neural
networks (DNNs). For readers not familiar with DNNs we can refer to the excellent
book by Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville [16].
Background on Logic Temporal logics are commonly used for specifying desired
and undesired properties of systems. For cyber-physical systems, it is common to use
temporal logics that can specify properties of real-valued signals over real time, such as
signal temporal logic (STL) [32] or metric temporal logic (MTL) [29].
A signal is a function s : D → S, with D ⊆ R≥0 an interval and either S ⊆ B or
S ⊆ R, where B = {>,⊥} and R is the set of reals. Signals defined on B are called
booleans, while those onR are said real-valued. A tracew = {s1, . . . , sn} is a finite set
of real-valued signals defined over the same interval D. We use variables xi to denote
the value of a real-valued signal at a particular time instant.
Let Σ = {σ1, . . . , σk} be a finite set of predicates σi : Rn → B, with σi ≡
pi(x1, . . . , xn) C 0, C ∈ {<,≤}, and pi : Rn → R a function in the variables
x1, . . . , xn. An STL formula is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := σ | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ϕ |ϕ UI ϕ (2)
where σ ∈ Σ is a predicate and I ⊂ R≥0 is a closed non-singular interval. Other
common temporal operators can be defined as syntactic abbreviations in the usual way,
like for instance ϕ1∨ϕ2 := ¬(¬ϕ1∧ϕ2), FI ϕ := > UI ϕ, or GI ϕ := ¬FI ¬ϕ. Given
a t ∈ R≥0, a shifted interval I is defined as t + I = {t + t′ | t′ ∈ I}. The qualitative
(or Boolean) semantics of STL is given in the usual way:
Definition 1 (Qualitative semantics). Let w be a trace, t ∈ R≥0, and ϕ be an STL
formula. The qualitative semantics of ϕ is inductively defined as follows:
w, t |= σ iff σ(w(t)) is true
w, t |= ¬ϕ iff w, t 6|= ϕ
w, t |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff w, t |= ϕ1 and w, t |= ϕ2
w, t |= ϕ1UIϕ2 iff ∃t′ ∈ t+ I s.t. w, t′ |= ϕ2 and ∀t′′ ∈ [t, t′], w, t′′ |= ϕ1
(3)
A trace w satisfies a formula ϕ if and only if w, 0 |= ϕ, in short w |= ϕ. STL
also admits a quantitative or robust semantics, which we omit for brevity. This pro-
vides quantitative information on the formula, telling how strongly the specification is
satisfied or violated for a given trace.
3 Attacks
There are several types of attacks on ML algorithms. For excellent material on various
attacks on ML algorithms we refer the reader to [20,3]. For example, in training time
attacks an adversary wishes to poison a data set so that a “bad” hypothesis is learned
by an ML-algorithm. This attack can be modeled as a game between the algorithm ML
and an adversary A as follows:
– ML picks an ordered training set S = ((xi, yi))mi=1.
– A picks an ordered training set Ŝ = ((xˆi, yˆi))ri=1, where r is bmc.
– ML learns on S ∪ Ŝ by essentially minimizing
min
w∈H
LS∪Ŝ(w) .
The attacker wants to maximize the above quantity and thus chooses Ŝ such that
minw∈H LS∪Ŝ(w) is maximized. For a recent paper on certified defenses for such at-
tacks we refer the reader to [47]. In model extraction attacks an adversary with black-
box access to a classifier, but no prior knowledge of the parameters of a ML algorithm or
training data, aims to duplicate the functionality of (i.e., steal) the classifier by querying
it on well chosen data points. For an example, model-extraction attacks see [49].
In this paper, we consider test-time attacks. We assume that the classifier Fw has
been trained without any interference from the attacker (i.e. no training time attacks).
Roughly speaking, an attacker has an image x (e.g. an image of stop sign) and wants
to craft a perturbation δ so that the label of x+ δ is what the attacker desires (e.g. yield
sign). The next sub-section describes test-time attacks in detail. We will sometimes refer
to Fw as simply F , but the hypothesis w is lurking in the background (i.e., whenever
we refer to w, it corresponds to the classifier F ).
3.1 Test-time Attacks
The adversarial goal is to take any input vector x ∈ <n and produce a minimally
altered version of x, adversarial sample denoted by x?, that has the property of being
misclassified by a classifier F : <n → C. Formally speaking, an adversary wishes to
solve the following optimization problem:
minδ∈<n µ(δ)
such that F (x+ δ) ∈ T
δ ·M = 0
The various terms in the formulation are µ is a metric on <n, T ⊆ C is a subset
of the labels (the reader should think of T as the target labels for the attacker), and
M (called the mask) is a n-dimensional 0 − 1 vector of size n. The objective function
minimizes the metric µ on the perturbation δ. Next we describe various constraints in
the formulation.
– F (x+ δ) ∈ T
The set T constrains the perturbed vector x+ δ 1 to have the label (according to F )
in the set T . For mis-classification problems the label of x and x+ δ are different,
so we have T = C −{F (x)}. For targeted mis-classification we have T = {t} (for
t ∈ C), where t is the target that an attacker wants (e.g., the attacker wants t to
correspond to a yield sign).
1 The vectors are added component wise
– δ ·M = 0
The vector M can be considered as a mask (i.e., an attacker can only perturb a
dimension i if M [i] = 0), i.e., if M [i] = 1 then δ[i] is forced to be 0. Essentially
the attacker can only perturb dimension i if the i-th component of M is 0, which
means that δ lies in k-dimensional space where k is the number of non-zero entries
in ∆. This constraint is important if an attacker wants to target a certain area of the
image (e.g., glasses of in a picture of person) to perturb.
– Convexity
Notice that even if the metric µ is convex (e.g., µ is the L2 norm), because of
the constraint involving F , the optimization problem is not convex (the constraint
δ ·M = 0 is convex). In general, solving convex optimization problems is more
tractable non-convex optimization [37].
Note that the constraint δ ·M = 0 essentially constrains the vector to be in a lower-
dimensional space and does add additional complexity to the optimization problem.
Therefore, for the rest of the section we will ignore that constraint and work with the
following formulation:
minδ∈<n µ(δ)
such that F (x+ δ) ∈ T
FGSM mis-classification attack - This algorithm is also known as the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [18]. The adversary crafts an adversarial sample x? = x+ δ for a
given legitimate sample x by computing the following perturbation:
δ = ε sign(∇xLF (x)) (4)
The function LF (x) is a shorthand for `(w,x, l(x)), where w is the hypothesis corre-
sponding to the classifier F , x is the data point and l(x) is the label of x (essentially we
evaluate the loss function at the hypothesis corresponding to the classifier). The gradi-
ent of the function LF is computed with respect to x using sample x and label y = l(x)
as inputs. Note that ∇xLF (x) is an n-dimensional vector and sign(∇xLF (x)) is a n-
dimensional vector whose i-th element is the sign of the ∇xLF (x))[i]. The value of
the input variation parameter ε factoring the sign matrix controls the perturbation’s
amplitude. Increasing its value increases the likelihood of x? being misclassified by the
classifier F but on the contrary makes adversarial samples easier to detect by humans.
The key idea is that FGSM takes a step in the direction of the gradient of the loss func-
tion and thus tries to maximize it. Recall that SGD takes a step in the direction that is
opposite to the gradient of the loss function because it is trying to minimize the loss
function.
JSMA targeted mis-classification attack - This algorithm is suitable for targeted mis-
classification [40]. We refer to this attack as JSMA throughout the rest of the paper.
To craft the perturbation δ, components are sorted by decreasing adversarial saliency
value. The adversarial saliency value S(x, t)[i] of component i for an adversarial target
class t is defined as:
S(x, t)[i] =
{
0 if ∂s(F )[t](x)∂ x[i] < 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂s(F )[j](x)
∂ x[i] > 0
∂s(F )[t](x)
∂ x[i]
∣∣∣∑j 6=t ∂s(F )[j](x)∂ x[i] ∣∣∣ otherwise (5)
where matrix JF =
[
∂s(F )[j](x)
∂ x[i]
]
ij
is the Jacobian matrix for the output of the softmax
layer s(F )(x). Since
∑
k∈C s(F )[k](x) = 1, we have the following equation:
∂s(F )[t](x)
∂ x[i]
= −
∑
j 6=t
∂s(F )[j](x)
∂ x[i]
The first case corresponds to the scenario if changing the i-th component of x takes
us further away from the target label t. Intuitively, S(x, t)[i] indicates how likely is
changing the i-th component of x going to “move towards” the target label t. Input
components i are added to perturbation δ in order of decreasing adversarial saliency
value S(x, t)[i] until the resulting adversarial sample x? = x+ δ achieves the target
label t. The perturbation introduced for each selected input component can vary. Greater
individual variations tend to reduce the number of components perturbed to achieve
misclassification.
CW targeted mis-classification attack. The CW-attack [6] is widely believed to be one
of the most “powerful” attacks. The reason is that CW cast their problem as an uncon-
strained optimization problem, and then use state-of-the art solver (i.e. Adam [26]). In
other words, they leverage the advances in optimization for the purposes of generating
adversarial examples.
In their paper Carlini-Wagner consider a wide variety of formulations, but we present
the one that performs best according to their evaluation. The optimization problem cor-
responding to CW is as follows:
minδ∈<n µ(δ)
such that F (x+ δ) = t
CW use an existing solver (Adam [26]) and thus need to make sure that each component
of x+ δ is between 0 and 1 (i.e. valid pixel values). Note that the other methods did not
face this issue because they control the “internals” of the algorithm (i.e., CW used a
solver in a “black box” manner). We introduce a new vector w whose i-th component
is defined according to the following equation:
δ[i] =
1
2
(tanh(w[i]) + 1)− x[i]
Since −1 ≤ tanh(w[i]) ≤ 1, it follows that 0 ≤ x[i] + δ[i] ≤ 1. In terms of this new
variable the optimization problem becomes:
minw∈<n µ( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x)
such that F ( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)) = t
Next they approximate the constraint (F (x) = t) with the following function:
g(x) = max
(
max
i 6=t
Z(F )(x)[i] − Z(F )(x)[t],−κ
)
In the equation given above Z(F ) is the input of the DNN to the softmax layer (i.e
s(F )(x) = softmax(Z(F )(x))) and κ is a confidence parameter (higher κ encourages
the solver to find adversarial examples with higher confidence). The new optimization
formulation is as follows:
minw∈<n µ( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x)
such that g( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)) ≤ 0
Next we incorporate the constraint into the objective function as follows:
minw∈<n µ( 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x) + c g( 12 (tanh(w) + 1))
In the objective given above, the “Lagrangian variable” c > 0 is a suitably chosen
constant (from the optimization literature we know that there exists c > 0 such that the
optimal solutions of the last two formulations are the same).
3.2 Adversarial Training
Once an attacker finds an adversarial example, then the algorithm can be retrained us-
ing this example. Researchers have found that retraining the model with adversarial
examples produces a more robust model. For this section, we will work with attack al-
gorithms that have a target label t (i.e. we are in the targeted mis-classification case,
such as JSMA or CW). Let A(w,x, t) be the attack algorithm, where its inputs are as
follows: w ∈ H is the current hypothesis, x is the data point, and t ∈ C is the target
label. The output of A(w,x, t) is a perturbation δ such that F (x+ δ) = t. If the attack
algorithm is simply a mis-classification algorithm (e.g. FGSM or Deepfool) we will
drop the last parameter t.
An adversarial training algorithm RA(w,x, t) is parameterized by an attack algo-
rithm A and outputs a new hypothesis w′ ∈ H . Adversarial training works by taking a
datapoint x and an attack algorithmA(w,x, t) as its input and then retraining the model
using a specially designed loss function (essentially one performs a single step of the
SGD using the new loss function). The question arises: what loss function to use during
the training? Different methods use different loss functions.
Next, we discuss some adversarial training algorithms proposed in the literature. At
a high level, an important point is that the more sophisticated an adversarial perturbation
algorithm is, harder it is to turn it into adversarial training. The reason is that it is hard to
“encode” the adversarial perturbation algorithm as an objective function and optimize
it. We will see this below, especially for the virtual adversarial training (VAT) proposed
by Miyato et al. [34].
Retraining for FGSM. We discussed the FGSM attack method earlier. In this case
A = FGSM. The loss function used by the retraining algorithmRFGSM(w,x, t) is as
follows:
`FGSM(w,xi, yi) = `(w,xi, yi) + λ` (w,xi +FGSM(w,xi), yi)
Recall that FGSM(w,x) was defined earlier, and λ is a regularization parameter. The
simplicity of FGSM(w,xi) allows taking its gradient, but this objective function re-
quires label yi because we are reusing the same loss function ` used to train the original
model. Further, FGSM(w,xi) may not be very good because it may not produce good
adversarial perturbation direction (i.e. taking a bigger step in this direction might pro-
duce a distorted image). The retraining algorithm is simply as follows: take one step in
the SGD using the loss function `FGSM at the data point xi.
A caveat is needed for taking gradient during the SGD step. At iteration t sup-
pose we have model parameters wt, and we need to compute the gradient of the ob-
jective. Note that FGSM(w,x) depends on w so by chain rule we need to compute
∂FGSM(w,x)/∂w|w=wt . However, this gradient is volatile 2, and so instead Goodfel-
low et al. only compute:
∂` (w,xi +FGSM(wt,xi), yi)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wt
Essentially they treat FGSM(wt,xi) as a constant while taking the derivative.
Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT). Miyato et al. [34] observed the drawback of
requiring label yi for the adversarial example. Their intuition is that one wants the
classifier to behave “similarly” on x and x+δ, where δ is the adversarial perturbation.
Specifically, the distance of the distribution corresponding to the output of the softmax
layer Fw on x and x+δ is small. VAT uses KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence as the
measure of the distance between two distributions. Recall that KL divergence of two
distributions P andQ over the same finite domainD is given by the following equation:
KL(P,Q) =
∑
i∈D
P (i) log
(
P (i)
Q(i)
)
Therefore, they propose that, instead of reusing `, they propose to use the following
for the regularizer,
∆(r,x, w) = KL (s(Fw)(x)[y], s(Fw)(x+r)[y])
for some r such that ‖r‖ ≤ δ. As a result, the label yi is no longer required. The
question is: what r to use? Miyato et al. [34] propose that in theory we should use the
“best” one as
max
r:‖r‖≤δ
KL (s(Fw)(x)[y], s(Fw)(x+r)[y])
This thus gives rise to the following loss function to use during retraining:
`VAT(w,xi, yi) = `(w, ,xi, yi) + λ max
r:‖r‖≤δ
∆(r,xi, w)
However, one cannot easily compute the gradient for the regularizer. Hence the authors
perform an approximation as follows:
1. Compute the Taylor expansion of∆(r,xi, w) at r = 0, so∆(r,xi, w) = rTH(xi, w) r
where H(xi, w) is the Hessian matrix of ∆(r,xi, w) with respect to r at r = 0.
2 In general, second-order derivatives of a classifier corresponding to a DNN vanish at several
points because several layers are piece-wise linear.
2. Thus max‖r‖≤δ∆(r,xi, w) = max‖r‖≤δ
(
rTH(xi, w) r
)
. By variational char-
acterization of the symmetric matrix (H(xi, w) is symmetric), r∗ = δv¯ where
v¯ = v(xi, w) is the unit eigenvector ofH(xi, w) corresponding to its largest eigen-
value. Note that r∗ depends on xi and w. Therefore the loss function becomes:
`VAT(θ,xi, yi) = `(θ,xi, yi) + λ∆(r
∗,xi, w)
3. Now suppose in the process of SGD we are at iteration t with model parameters
wt, and we need to compute ∂`VAT/∂w|w=wt . By chain rule we need to compute
∂r∗/∂w|w=wt . However the authors find that such gradients are volatile, so they
instead fix r∗ as a constant at the point θt, and compute
∂KL (s(Fw)(x)[y], s(Fw)(x+r)[y])
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wt
3.3 Black Box Attacks
Recall that earlier attacks (e.g. FGSM and JSMA) needed white-box access to the clas-
sifier F (essentially because these attacks require first order information about the clas-
sifier). In this section, we present black-box attacks. In this case, an attacker can only
ask for the labels F (x) for certain data points. Our presentation is based on [39], but is
more general.
Let A(w,x, t) be the attack algorithm, where its inputs are: w ∈ H is the current
hypothesis, x is the data point, and t ∈ C is the target label. The output of A(w,x, t)
is a perturbation δ such that F (x+ δ) = t. If the attack algorithm is simply a mis-
classification algorithm (e.g. FGSM or Deepfool) we will drop the last parameter t
(recall that in this case the attack algorithm returns a δ such that F (x+ δ) 6= F (x)). An
adversarial training algorithm RA(w,x, t) is parameterized by an attack algorithm A
and outputs a new hypothesis w′ ∈ H (this was discussed in the previous subsection).
Initialization: We pick a substitute classifier G and an initial seed data set S0 and train
G. For simplicity, we will assume that the sample space Z = X × Y and the hypoth-
esis space H for G is same as that of F (the classifier under attack). However, this is
not crucial to the algorithm. We will call G the substitute classifier and F the target
classifier. Let S = S0 be the initial data set, which will be updated as we iterate.
Iteration: Run the attack algorithm A(w,x, t) on G and obtain a δ. If F (x+ δ) = t,
then stop we are done. If F (x+ δ) = t′ but not equal to t, we augment the data set S
as follows:
S = S ∪ (x+ δ, t′)
We now retrainG on this new data set, which essentially means running the SGD on the
new data point (x+ δ, t′). Notice that we can also use adversarial trainingRA(w,x, t)
to update G (to our knowledge this has been not tried out in the literature).
3.4 Defenses
Defenses with formal guarantees against test-time attacks have proven elusive. For ex-
ample, Carlini and Wagner [7] have a recent paper that breaks ten recent defense propos-
als. However, defenses that are based on robust-optimization objectives have demon-
strated promise [36,28,46]. Several techniques for verifying properties of a DNN (in
isolation) have appeared recently (e.g., [25,21,13,14]). Due to space limitations we will
not give a detailed account of all these defenses.
4 Semantic Adversarial Analysis and Training
A central tenet of this paper is that the analysis of deep neural networks (and machine
learning components, in general) must be more semantic. In particular, we advocate for
the increased use of semantics in several aspects of adversarial analysis and training,
including the following:
• Semantic Modification Space: Recall that the goal of adversarial attacks is to modify
an input vector x with an adversarial modification δ so as to achieve a target mis-
classification. Such modifications typically do not incorporate the application-level
semantics or the context within which the neural network is deployed. We argue that
it is essential to incorporate more application-level, contextual semantics into the
modification space. Such semantic modifications correspond to modifications that
may arise more naturally within the context of the target application. We view this
not as ignoring arbitrary modifications (which are indeed worth considering with
a security mind set), but as prioritizing the design and analysis of DNNs towards
semantic adversarial modifications. Sec. 4.1 discusses this point in more detail.
• System-Level Specifications: The goal of much of the work in adversarial attacks
has been to generate misclassifications. However, not all misclassifications are made
equal. We contend that it is important to find misclassifications that lead to violations
of desired properties of the system within which the DNN is used. Therefore, one
must identify such system-level specifications and devise analysis methods to verify
whether an erroneous behavior of the DNN component can lead to the violation
of a system-level specification. System-level counterexamples can be valuable aids
to repair and re-design machine learning models. See Sec. 4.1 for a more detailed
discussion of this point.
• Semantic (Re-)Training: Most machine learning models are trained with the main
goal of reducing misclassifications as measured by a suitably crafted loss function.
We contend that it is also important to train the model to avoid undesirable behaviors
at the system level. For this, we advocate using methods for semantic training, where
system-level specifications, counterexamples, and other artifacts are used to improve
the semantic quality of the ML model. Sec. 4.2 explores a few ideas.
• Confidence-Based Analysis and Decision Making: Deep neural networks (and other
ML models) often produce not just an output label, but also an associated confidence
level. We argue that confidence levels must be used within the design of ML-based
systems. They provide a way of exposing more information from the DNN to the
surrounding system that uses its decisions. Such confidence levels can also be useful
to prioritize analysis towards cases that are more egregious failures of the DNN.
More generally, any explanations and auxiliary information generated by the DNN
that accompany its main output decisions can be valuable aids in their design and
analysis.
4.1 Compositional Falsification
We discuss the problem of performing system-level analysis of a deep learning compo-
nent, using recent work by the authors [10,11] to illustrate the main points. The material
in this section is mainly based on [43].
We begin with some basic notation. Let S denote the model of the full system S
under verification, E denote a model of its environment, and Φ denote the specification
to be verified. C is an ML model (e.g. DNN) that is part of S. As in Sec. 3, let x be
an input to C. We assume that Φ is a trace property – a set of behaviors of the closed
system obtained by composing S with E, denoted S‖E. The goal of falsification is to
find one or more counterexamples showing how the composite system S‖E violates Φ.
In this context, semantic analysis of C is about finding a modification δ from a space
of semantic modifications ∆ such that C, on x+ δ, produces a misclassification that
causes S‖E to violate Φ.
Controller Plant
Environment
Learning‐Based Perception
Sensor Input
Fig. 1. Automatic Emergency Braking System (AEBS) in closed loop. An image classifier based
on deep neural networks is used to perceive objects in the ego vehicle’s frame of view.
Example Problem As an illustrative example, consider a simple model of an Auto-
matic Emergency Braking System (AEBS), that attempts to detect objects in front of
a vehicle and actuate the brakes when needed to avert a collision. Figure 1 shows the
AEBS as a system composed of a controller (automatic braking), a plant (vehicle sub-
system under control, including transmission), and an advanced sensor (camera along
with an obstacle detector based on deep learning). The AEBS, when combined with the
vehicle’s environment, forms a closed loop control system. The controller regulates the
acceleration and braking of the plant using the velocity of the subject (ego) vehicle and
the distance between it and an obstacle. The sensor used to detect the obstacle includes
a camera along with an image classifier based on DNNs. In general, this sensor can
provide noisy measurements due to incorrect image classifications which in turn can
affect the correctness of the overall system.
Suppose we want to verify whether the distance between the ego vehicle and a
preceding obstacle is always larger than 2 meters. In STL, this requirement Φ can be
written as G0,T (‖xego − xobs‖2 ≥ 2). Such verification requires the exploration of a
very large input space comprising of the control inputs (e.g., acceleration and braking
pedal angles) and the machine learning (ML) component’s feature space (e.g., all the
possible pictures observable by the camera). The latter space is particularly large — for
example, note that the feature space of RGB images of dimension 1000 × 600px (for
an image classifier) contains 2561000×600×3 elements.
In the above example, S‖E is the closed loop system in Fig. 1 where S comprises
the DNN and the controller, and E comprises everything else. C is the DNN used for
object detection and classification.
This case study has been implemented in Matlab/Simulink3 in two versions that
use two different Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): the Caffe [22] version of
AlexNet [30] and the Inception-v3 model created with Tensorflow [33], both trained on
the ImageNet database [1]. Further details about this example can be obtained from [10].
Approach A key idea in our approach is to have a system-level verifier that abstracts
away the component C while verifying Φ on the resulting abstraction. This system-
level verifier communicates with a component-level analyzer that searches for semantic
modifications δ to the input x of C that could lead to violations of the system-level
specification Φ. Figure 2 illustrates this approach.
System‐Level
Analysis
Component
(ML) Analysis
System S
Env. E
Property 
Region of Uncertainty
(projected) UROUC
Component‐level errors
(misclassifications)
Correct / Incorrect (+ counterexamples)
Fig. 2. Compositional Verification Approach. A system-level verifier cooperates with a
component-level analysis procedure (e.g., adversarial analysis of a machine learning component
to find misclassifications).
We formalize this approach while trying to emphasize the intuition. Let T denote the
set of all possible traces of the composition of the system with its environment, S‖E.
Given a specification Φ, let TΦ denote the set of traces in T satisfying Φ. Let UΦ denote
the projection of these traces onto the state and interface variables of the environment
E. UΦ is termed as the validity domain of Φ, i.e., the set of environment behaviors
for which Φ is satisfied. Similarly, the complement set U¬Φ is the set of environment
behaviors for which Φ is violated.
Our approach works as follows:
1. The System-level Verifier initially performs two analyses with two extreme ab-
stractions of the ML component. First, it performs an optimistic analysis, wherein
3 https://github.com/dreossi/analyzeNN
the ML component is assumed to be a “perfect classifier”, i.e., all feature vectors
are correctly classified. In situations where ML is used for perception/sensing, this
abstraction assumes perfect perception/sensing. Using this abstraction, we com-
pute the validity domain for this abstract model of the system, denoted U+Φ . Next,
it performs a pessimistic analysis where the ML component is abstracted by a
“completely-wrong classifier”, i.e., all feature vectors are misclassified. Denote the
resulting validity domain as U−Φ . It is expected that U
+
Φ ⊇ U−Φ .
Abstraction permits the System-level Verifier to operate on a lower-dimensional
search space and identify a region in this space that may be affected by the malfunc-
tioning of component C — a so-called “region of uncertainty” (ROU). This region,
UCROU is computed as U
+
Φ \ U−Φ . In other words, it comprises all environment be-
haviors that could lead to a system-level failure when component C malfunctions.
This region UCROU , projected onto the inputs of C, is communicated to the ML An-
alyzer. (Concretely, in the context of our example of Sec. 4.1, this corresponds to
finding a subspace of images that corresponds to UCROU .)
2. The Component-level Analyzer, also termed as a Machine Learning (ML) Ana-
lyzer, performs a detailed analysis of the projected ROU UCROU . A key aspect of
the ML analyzer is to explore the semantic modification space efficiently. Several
options are available for such an analysis, including the various adversarial analysis
techniques surveyed earlier (applied to the semantic space), as well as systematic
sampling methods [10]. Even though a component-level formal specification may
not be available, each of these adversarial analyses has an implicit notion of “mis-
classification.” We will refer to these as component-level errors. The working of
the ML analyzer from [10] is shown in Fig. 3.
3. When the Component-level (ML) Analyzer finds component-level errors (e.g., those
that trigger misclassifications of inputs whose labels are easily inferred), it commu-
nicates that information back to the System-level Verifier, which checks whether
the ML misclassification can lead to a violation of the system-level property Φ. If
yes, we have found a system-level counterexample. If no component-level errors
are found, and the system-level verification can prove the absence of counterexam-
ples, then it can conclude that Φ is satisfied. Otherwise, if the ML misclassification
cannot be extended to a system-level counterexample, the ROU is updated and the
revised ROU passed back to the Component-level Analyzer.
The communication between the System-level Verifier and the Component-level (ML)
Analyzer continues thus, until we either prove/disprove Φ, or we run out of resources.
Sample Results We have applied the above approach to the problem of compositional
falsification of cyber-physical systems (CPS) with machine learning components [10].
For this class of CPS, including those with highly non-linear dynamics and even black-
box components, simulation-based falsification of temporal logic properties is an ap-
proach that has proven effective in industrial practice (e.g., [23,50]). We present here a
sample of results on the AEBS example from [10], referring the reader to more detailed
descriptions in the other papers on the topic [10,11].
In Figure 4 we show one result of our analysis for the Inception-v3 deep neural net-
work. This figure shows both correctly classified and misclassified images on a range of
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Fig. 3. Machine Learning Analyzer: Searching the Semantic Modification Space. A concrete se-
mantic modification space (top left) is mapped into a discrete abstract space. Systematic sam-
pling, using low-discrepancy methods, yields points in the abstract space. These points are con-
cretized and the NN is evaluated on them to ascertain if they are correctly or wrongly classified.
The misclassifications are fed back for system-level analysis.
synthesized images where (i) the environment vehicle is moved away from or towards
the ego vehicle (along z-axis), (ii) it is moved sideways along the road (along x-axis),
or (iii) the brightness of the image is modified. These modifications constitute the 3
axes of the figure. Our approach finds misclassifications that do not lead to system-
level property violations and also misclassifications that do lead to such violations. For
example, Figure 4 shows two misclassified images, one with an environment vehicle
that is too far away to be a safety hazard, as well as another image showing an environ-
ment vehicle driving slightly on the wrong side of the road, which is close enough to
potentially cause a violation of the system-level safety property (of maintaining a safe
distance from the ego vehicle).
For further details about this and other results with our approach, we refer the reader
to [10,11].
4.2 Semantic Training
In this section we discuss two ideas for semantic training and retraining of deep neural
networks. We first discuss the use of hinge loss as a way of incorporating confidence
levels into the training process. Next, we discuss how system-level counterexamples and
associated misclassifications can be used in the retraining process to both improve the
Fig. 4. Misclassified Images for Inception-v3 Neural Network (trained on ImageNet with Ten-
sorFlow). Red crosses are misclassified images and green circles are correctly classified. Our
system-level analysis finds a corner-case image that could lead to a system-level safety violation.
accuracy of ML models and also to gain more assurance in the overall system con-
taining the ML component. A more detailed study of using misclassifications (ML
component-level counterexamples) to improve the accuracy of the neural network is
presented in [12]; this approach is termed counterexample-guided data augmentation,
inspired by counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [8] and similar
paradigms.
Experimental Setup As in the preceding section, we consider an Automatic Emer-
gency Braking System (AEBS) using a DNN-based object detector. However, in these
experiments we use an AEBS deployed within Udacity’s self-driving car simulator, as
reported in our previous work [11].4 We modified the Udacity simulator to focus ex-
clusively on braking. In our case studies, the car follows some predefined way-points,
while accelerating and braking are controlled by the AEBS connected to a convolu-
tional neural network (CNN). In particular, whenever the CNN detects an obstacle in
the images provided by the onboard camera, the AEBS triggers a braking action that
slows the vehicle down and avoids the collision against the obstacle.
We designed and implemented a CNN to predict the presence of a cow on the road.
Given an image taken by the onboard camera, the CNN classifies the picture in either
“cow” or “not cow” category. The CNN architecture is shown in Fig. 5. It consists of
eight layers: the first six are alternations of convolutions and max-pools with ReLU ac-
tivations, the last two are a fully connected layer and a softmax that outputs the network
prediction (confidence level for each label).
We generated a data set of 1000 road images with and without cows. We split the
data set into 80% training and 20% validation data. Our model was implemented and
4 Udacity’s self-driving car simulator: https://github.com/udacity/
self-driving-car-sim
Fig. 5. CNN architecture.
trained using the Tensorflow library with cross-entropy cost function and the Adam al-
gorithm optimizer (learning rate 10−4). The model reached 95% accuracy on the test
set. Finally, the resulting CNN is connected to the Unity simulator via Socket.IO proto-
col.5 Fig. 6 depicts a screenshot of the simulator with the AEBS in action in proximity
of a cow.
Fig. 6. Udacity simulator with a CNN-based AEBS in action.
Hinge Loss In this section, we investigate the relationship between multiclass hinge
loss functions and adversarial examples. Hinge loss is defined as follows:
l(yˆ) = max(0, k + max
i 6=l
(yˆi)− yˆl) (6)
5 Socket.IO protocol: https://github.com/socketio
where (x, y) is a training sample, yˆ = F (x) is a prediction, and l is the ground truth
label of x. For this section, the output yˆ is a numerical value indicating the confidence
level of the network for each class. For example, yˆ can be the output of a softmax layer
as described in Sec. 2.
Consider what happens as we vary k. Suppose there is an i 6= l s.t. yˆi > yˆl. Pick
the largest such i, call it i∗. For k = 0, we will incur a loss of yˆi∗ − yˆl for the ex-
ample (x, y). However, as we make k more negative, we increase the tolerance for
“misclassifications” produced by the DNN F . Specifically, we incur no penalty for a
misclassification as long as the associated confidence level deviates from that of the
ground truth label by no more than |k|. Larger the absolute value of k, the greater the
tolerance. Intuitively, this biases the training process towards avoiding “high confidence
misclassifications”.
In this experiment, we investigate the role of k and explore different parameter
values. At training time, we want to minimize the mean hinge loss across all training
samples. We trained the CNN described above with different values of k and evaluated
its precision on both the original test set and a set of counterexamples generated for the
original model, i.e., the network trained with cross-entropy loss.
Table 1 reports accuracy and log loss for different values of k on both original and
counterexamples test sets (Toriginal and Tcountex, respectively).
Toriginal Tcountex
k acc log-loss acc log-loss
0 0.69 0.68 0.11 0.70
- 0.01 0.77 0.69 0.00 0.70
-0.05 0.52 0.70 0.67 0.69
-0.1 0.50 0.70 0.89 0.68
-0.25 0.51 0.70 0.77 0.68
Table 1. Hinge loss with different k values.
Table 1 shows interesting results. We note that a negative k increases the accu-
racy of the model on counterexamples. In other words, biasing the training process by
penalizing high-confidence misclassifications improves accuracy on counterexamples!
However, the price to pay is a reduction of accuracy on the original test set. This is still
a very preliminary result and further experimentation and analysis is necessary.
System-Level Counterexamples By using the composition falsification framework
presented in Sec. 4.1, we identify orientations, displacements on the x-axis, and color
of an obstacle that leads to a collision of the vehicle with the obstacle. Figure 7 de-
picts configurations of the obstacle that lead to specification violations, and hence, to
collisions.
In an experiment, we augment the original training set with the elements of Tcountex,
i.e., images of the original test set Toriginal that are misclassified by the original model
(see Sec. 4.2).
Fig. 7. Semantic counterexamples: obstacle configurations leading to property violations (in red).
We trained the model with both cross-entropy and hinge loss for 20 epochs. Both
models achieve a high accuracy on the validation set (≈ 92%). However, when plugged
into the AEBS, neither of these models prevents the vehicle from colliding against the
obstacle with an adversarial configuration. This seems to indicate that simply retraining
with some semantic (system-level) counterexamples generated by analyzing the system
containing the ML model may not be sufficient to eliminate all semantic counterexam-
ples.
Interestingly, though, it appears that in both cases the impact of the vehicle with the
obstacle happens at a slower speed than the one with the original model. In other words,
the AEBS system starts detecting the obstacle earlier than with the original model,
and therefore starts braking earlier as well. This means that despite the specification
violations, the counterexample retraining procedure seems to help with limiting the
damage in case of a collision. Coupled with a run-time assurance framework (see [44]),
semantic retraining could help mitigate the impact of misclassifications on the system-
level behavior.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we surveyed the field of adversarial machine learning with a special focus
on deep learning and on test-time attacks. We then introduced the idea of semantic ad-
versarial machine (deep) learning, where adversarial analysis and training of ML mod-
els is performed using the semantics and context of the overall system within which the
ML models are utilized. We identified several ideas for integrating semantics into ad-
versarial learning, including using a semantic modification space, system-level formal
specifications, training using semantic counterexamples, and utilizing more detailed in-
formation about the outputs produced by the ML model, including confidence levels,
in the modules that use these outputs to make decisions. Preliminary experiments show
the promise of these ideas, but also indicate that much remains to be done. We be-
lieve the field of semantic adversarial learning will be a rich domain for research at the
intersection of machine learning, formal methods, and related areas.
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